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Chairman: Mr. Erdös ..... (Hungary)

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

Agenda items 64 to 84 (*continued*)

General debate on all disarmament and international security items

Mr. Sun (Republic of Korea): Allow me to begin by extending my warm congratulations to you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. I assure you and the other members of the Bureau of my delegation's full support and cooperation in dealing with the important issues that lie ahead.

The horrific terrorist attacks in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania on 11 September were an immense tragedy not only for the United States, but for the entire world. We condemn all forms of terrorism and express our sympathy and solidarity with the United States as we build an international coalition to combat terrorism.

These heinous acts have awakened the international community to the need to deal with both old and new security threats. The primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security and, to that end, to take effective measures for the prevention and removal of all threats to peace. Today, terrorism transcends the mere regional scale, and it has been demonstrated that terrorist groups with a global reach can shake the very contours of global security. Under those circumstances, the First Committee should first and foremost focus its energy on strengthening international systems that counter the proliferation of nuclear and biochemical weapons and missiles.

As I reflect upon the past year, I cannot help but think that more progress could have been made in the field of multilateral disarmament and arms control. Above all, we are deeply concerned about the continued stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. We have also been unable to implement all the measures contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), or to further develop various instruments. Of course, the complex and sensitive nature of international security makes it difficult to make progress in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Moreover, we increasingly find ourselves facing new security threats that require new strategies.

Despite continued efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, notably ballistic missiles, the spread of those weapons remains one of the most serious security threats to the international community. We believe that, as the Secretary-General urged in his report entitled "Road Map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration" (A/56/326), the international community should strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and should keep all options open for achieving that aim. It is the long-held conviction of the Government of the Republic of Korea that we need to consolidate existing multilateral instruments and arrangements and at the same time develop an international system that is

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tailored to addressing new kinds of threats, as they often find a way to circumvent existing barriers.

Various draft resolutions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation will be debated in this Committee. Even though the headway made in the field of nuclear disarmament has not met our expectations, we should not lose patience and optimism. Indeed, disarmament is a product of dynamic global security circumstances. It should be evaluated over a long-term period, as it naturally goes through numerous ups and downs. We believe that nuclear disarmament should be a practical, step-by-step process based on a spirit of unequivocal commitment, as agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We are of the view that, as a first step to that end, bilateral nuclear reductions by the largest nuclear-weapon States need to be encouraged. Because the multilateral disarmament process should ensure that the momentum continues, progress in unilateral and bilateral nuclear reductions will create an atmosphere conducive to nuclear disarmament. My delegation also would like to underline the importance of universal adherence to and full compliance with the NPT.

It is disappointing that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is not yet in force, and that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty have long been at a standstill. There is no doubt that the CTBT has established an effective and verifiable international norm against further nuclear testing, as demonstrated by the firm reaction to developments in 1998. We hope that the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT will attain its objectives. With respect to a fissile material cut-off treaty, it is certainly frustrating that the Conference on Disarmament has yet to commence negotiation of the treaty, which is the next logical step on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda. We look forward to seeing the early start of negotiations, a process that would certainly reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Pending negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, we call upon all relevant States to join a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The recent terrorist attacks highlighted the importance of physical protection, accounting and nuclear non-proliferation measures that would prevent entities from acquiring and converting nuclear materials or technologies. In that vein, it is very encouraging that this year's General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted an important resolution in a timely manner. The resolution emphasizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in preventing its illicit use and the sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. We hope that the Agency will embark on a thorough review of the relevant programmes to identify what can be done to enhance the security of nuclear material and facilities.

Recent developments have demonstrated that the international community can no longer afford to remain trapped in traditional ways of thinking when it comes to dealing with weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. Nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles are no longer limited to cold-war rivalries or competitions for regional hegemony. Furthermore, we need to take steps to ensure that chemical and biological weapons do not become available as alternate tools for those States that lack nuclear capabilities. The recent warning by the Director-General of the World Health Organization, calling upon countries to strengthen their capacity to respond to the consequences of the use of biological or chemical agents as weapons, should not go unheeded.

Despite the long and painstaking process, we feel that it is unfortunate that negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have failed to fulfil their mandate. Since the Convention falls far short of the mantra of disarmament instruments — trust but verify — we look forward to a constructive outcome with respect to the future direction of the BWC protocol at the Review Conference in November.

Global efforts to counter the growing threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation also need to be redoubled. I wish to note that the Panel of Governmental Experts on missiles has held its first session, in accordance with last year's General Assembly resolution 55/33 A, confirming the seriousness of the risks associated with missile proliferation and the urgent need to tackle that issue. Though we, as a Panel member, noted different priorities and approaches on the issue as well as some arguments that were only remotely related to the urgent priorities, we look forward to the expert Panel's development of constructive recommendations to address the issue. In that context, my delegation welcomes the recent adoption of a draft international code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation, initiated by the Missile Technology Control Regime

(MTCR). We will look forward to the early launching and universalization of the draft code, which is significant as the first international norm against the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

In the field of conventional arms, the adoption of the Programme of Action at this year's United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was a veritable success. What made this achievement so meaningful was the fact that the entire international community came together to recognize the magnitude of these problems and to agree on measures to combat and prevent illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons at the national, regional and global levels. It must be stressed, however, that the Programme of Action is to be regarded as the start of a long-term process with practical follow-up.

We firmly believe that the fight against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons should start at the national level, at which Governments should make an effort to tighten control over the manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of these weapons. At the same time, the international community must act to address the root causes of conflict, which have a bearing on the illicit trafficking in, and destabilizing accumulation of, small arms. For this reason, enhanced efforts should be exerted in a concerted manner in all areas: disarmament, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building.

We have a broad arms-control agenda awaiting our renewed commitment. In the light of the recent terrorist attacks, I would like to reaffirm the need to sensitize ourselves to new threats to international security and disarmament. At the same time, we must not neglect our obligation to strengthen existing treaties and export control arrangements on the multilateral front. The value of multilateral disarmament instruments cannot be evaluated simply in terms of the reduced number of weapons. Rather, their beauty lies in the predictability and transparency they afford and in their ability to extract from Member States a stronger and more genuine level of commitment.

Mr. Chairman, as always, my delegation looks forward to working closely and constructively with you and other delegations in the coming weeks.

Mr. Wisnumurti (Indonesia): I wish at the outset, Sir, to express my delegation's congratulations on your unanimous election to the chairmanship of this Committee. We are confident that under your able guidance, substantive progress will be made in our endeavours to advance the cause of disarmament. Our felicitations go also to the other members of the Bureau on their election. Let me avail myself of this opportunity to thank Ambassador U Mya Than for his leadership and for the contributions he made during the previous session as Chairman of this Committee. I would also like to express our appreciation to Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, for his lucid and comprehensive statement on the various issues on our agenda.

Before proceeding further, my delegation wishes to associate itself with the statement delivered yesterday by Ambassador U Kyaw Tint Swe of Myanmar on behalf of the member States of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The First Committee is meeting this year in an atmosphere of heightened expectation. In the Millennium Declaration, our heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim. There were concrete achievements at the conclusion of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held last year. The number of Member States which have adhered to the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons has increased. There has also been an increase in the number of countries that have either acceded to or ratified the Convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines. In addition, new proposals and initiatives are on the table — here in New York and in Geneva and Vienna — on a range of issues of concern and interest to all Member States.

However, expectations should not be equated with progress and success, for even a cursory survey of the current international scene will impress on us the distressing reality of virtual deadlock in arms reduction and disarmament. Despite a welter of statements, exhortations and resolutions on numerous occasions and in a variety of forums, we are now, in terms of global outlay and expenditures, some 35,000 nuclear warheads, a massive accumulation of conventional armaments and $800 billion further away from the goal of disarmament.

Far from realizing the promise of nuclear disarmament in the post-cold-war era, efforts by the international community to curb and eliminate these armaments have been deadlocked. The systematic and progressive efforts by the nuclear-weapon States have fallen far short of the commitments undertaken at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. More than a year after the unequivocal undertaking at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, measures have not been identified, much less acted upon. Consequently, the goal of nuclear disarmament today seems more distant than ever.

Other developments are equally disconcerting. The START process is at a stalemate. The outcome of our endeavours for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remains unclear. Negotiations under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Group for the verification protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention could not be completed. There is growing uncertainty over the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Furthermore, the information age has spawned a revolution in military affairs, which, among other things, is facilitating the militarization of outer space. Technological factors are having a direct impact on international security. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the growing lethality of technologies promises to set in motion a new generation of weapons of mass destruction. These retrograde developments constitute a quantum jump into the most dangerous aspects of the cold-war era.

We cannot accept the premise that nuclear weapons can be retained indefinitely and not used accidentally or intentionally, with disastrous consequences. The Secretary-General has solemnly warned the international community of nuclear dangers. While the cooperation between the nuclear-weapon States to reduce the dangers emanating from nuclear theft and nuclear terrorism is laudable, it must not distract us from their failure to achieve progress regarding the most imminent danger posed by nuclear warheads, many of which are on launch-on-warning readiness. Even the smallest warheads can kill thousands of innocent people, and, in fact, would inevitably kill tens of thousands if they were ever used. Hence, their retention is flawed, unjustified and immoral. The nuclear-weapon States share a joint and collective responsibility for their reduction and elimination.

In the new millennium, other priorities include eliminating the so-called tactical nuclear weapons; banning fissile materials for weapons purposes; arresting the acquisition of advanced weapons of mass destruction; maintaining the credibility of the non-proliferation regime; and concluding an international convention against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States. These should constitute the thrust of the international community's concerted efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and the dangers emanating from them. But these objectives cannot be achieved by new rationalizations for the continued retention of these armaments or by the reiteration of nuclear doctrines and posturing. The persistence of the old image of nuclear weapons as symbols of status and components of national power, which has for so long hindered disarmament, cannot be erased unless the obsolescence of nuclear weapons and the pervasive sense of global insecurity they have created are recognized.

The nuclear weapons and related issues are critically important for the Asia-Pacific region with its strategic importance, large population and sizeable economies, which will inevitably be affected by developments in disarmament and security. Its people are now confronted by new regional uncertainties and insecurities. Hence, in the context of the reciprocity of obligations, the nuclear-weapon States should faithfully implement both the letter and the spirit of agreements relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which are interlinked and inseparable. The lack of progress on the former will inevitably have an adverse impact on efforts towards the latter.

The significance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in preventing the development of more advanced weapons has been universally recognized. We are gratified that the prospects for achieving this long-sought goal have been bolstered by some positive developments. There has been a steady increase in the number of signatory and ratifying States, which today stands at 161 and 84, respectively. No nuclear explosions have been carried out since the conclusion of the test-ban Treaty in 1996, while a moratorium on testing has continued. Thus, a global no-testing norm now commands universal support. Substantive progress has also been made in creating an effective and reliable worldwide verification mechanism.

But as we are aware, the entry into force of the CTBT is dependent upon ratification by States listed in annex 2. My delegation shares the foreboding of other member States that delaying the entry into force of the Treaty increases the risk that nuclear testing could resume, leading to a renewed nuclear arms race, with its attendant instability and confrontation. The early entry into force of the Treaty has therefore become imperative. My Government has signed the Treaty and is in the process of its ratification, which is expected in the foreseeable future. Let me also mention parenthetically that Indonesia has presided over the Preparatory Committee for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in the second half of 2001.

As far as the Bangkok Treaty is concerned, the *raison d'être* was and will continue to be to insulate South-East Asia from the nuclear environment surrounding that region and to ensure security and stability. It exemplifies the commitment of States parties to non-proliferation. That Treaty, together with the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba, will ensure that the entire southern hemisphere remains free from the menace posed by nuclear weapons.

The Bangkok Treaty also epitomizes the problems faced in strengthening the efficacy of the zones that have recently come into existence. In their continuing endeavours to render the Treaty fully operable through the accession to its Protocol by the nuclear Powers, members States of the Association of South-East Asian Nations have been engaged in a series of intense consultations with the nuclear Powers in an earnest effort to seek a mutually satisfactory solution to the outstanding problems. We are gratified that important progress has been made and that these consultations will be continued, leading ultimately to the consolidation of the Bangkok Treaty.

The extension of the arms race into outer space portends incalculable consequences for disarmament. There can be no doubt that plans to develop strategic defence capabilities and an enlarged scope for anti-satellite weapons would introduce further destabilizing elements into the strategic environment. We know from past experience that every new development and innovation in nuclear weapons technology, whether offensive or defensive, has inexorably led to an acceleration of the arms race. In the context of outer space, that would be tantamount to a quantum leap in vertical proliferation and would usher an entirely new dimension into the arms race. Such developments would also undermine existing agreements on arms limitation, especially the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). Furthermore, the astronomical costs involved in developing a space-based defence system, taken together with those incurred to counter such a move, would inevitably result in heightened strategic competition and greater mutual vulnerability and further deepen the global economic crisis. It is imperative, therefore, to stop the further militarization of outer space and to ensure that this pristine environment is used exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all mankind.

In this connection, it is pertinent to note also that existing international agreements are inadequate and ambiguous and contain loopholes to prevent an arms race in outer space. In a document circulated last year, the Group of 21 stated that the prevention of an arms race in outer space has assumed greater urgency because of legitimate concerns that existing legal instruments are inadequate to deter imminent attempts for the further militarization of outer space. Unless urgent action is taken, including the strengthening of the current legal regime, there is little doubt that the last frontier of human endeavour will soon turn into a new battleground.

Indonesia shares the increasing concern of States in our region over the implications of the development, proliferation and deployment of ballistic missiles, which can carry both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. A large number of missiles have placed the security of States in jeopardy, as they have capabilities to target major cities and population centres. These ominous developments have underscored the need for a multilaterally negotiated, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreement to reduce and eliminate destabilizing ballistic missiles without hindering their application for peaceful purposes.

Indonesia hopes that the establishment of a panel of governmental experts on missiles by the Secretary-General to study this issue will be a first step leading to an outcome that would take into account the security interests of all nations. This is the first time that Member States have decided to focus attention on the issue of missiles as a source of instability. It is anticipated that the panel's recommendations will

include issues such as limiting the production and deployment of missiles, a global missile warning system and other ways of controlling missile proliferation, incentives to encourage States to abstain from producing long-range missiles and a multilateral regime or convention to counter missile proliferation.

Our attention is also drawn to plans for missile defence that will inevitably have far-reaching repercussions for existing arms control treaties and on the prospects for future agreements. These would be incompatible with the limiting provisions of the ABM Treaty, which has been recognized by its signatories as a critical component of strategic stability and an indispensable element to further reduce strategic armaments. While missile defence will have global consequences, Asia, where it may trigger a new and vicious arms race, will be the region most affected. Hence, the need for a comprehensive approach through negotiations to address these new concerns in resolving this issue is all too self-evident.

It is regrettable to note that, during the past four years, the Conference on Disarmament has not initiated negotiations on any issue and has not established any ad hoc committees. A lack of consensus on its programme of work has resulted in a deadlock on every item on its agenda. This stalemate has called into question its credibility as the sole multilateral negotiating body in this field. It also faces the prospects of being further marginalized. In this era of globalization, the international community must act jointly for an integrated and multilateral approach to disarmament issues, which have become global and indivisible. It should also be recognized that the multilateral character of this body has in the past clarified the complexities attendant upon disarmament, especially in its nuclear dimension, and facilitated arms limitation treaties. The challenge now is to reassert its primacy and its unique character. We believe that the time has come for this forum to break the impasse and initiate negotiations on the priority issues that have for far too long languished on its agenda. As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Indonesia remains totally committed to multilateralism and to negotiations under its auspices.

The Programme of Action adopted by consensus by the recently concluded United Nations Conference on small arms and light weapons is a substantive document, containing a number of practical measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in these weapons in all its aspects. It sets out a realistic, achievable and comprehensive approach in addressing the relevant problems at the national, regional and global levels. It made an important contribution in promoting international cooperation and assistance in dealing with the serious and persistent problems caused by the illicit trade in small arms. And it succeeded in mobilizing the political will of the international community and in establishing a follow-up and review mechanism. The implementation of its recommendations will make a constructive contribution to national and regional security.

Finally, Indonesia and other non-aligned countries are committed to the convening of a fourth General Assembly special session devoted to disarmament. We are gratified to note some forward movement in this regard, especially regarding objectives and agenda. We see the session's convening, with the participation of all States, as being in the common interest to limit and eliminate armaments through a balanced approach that will ensure a substantive outcome and success of our endeavours.

I would be remiss in my duty if before concluding I did not refer to the horrible tragedy that took place in this very city of New York on 11 September, with its horrendous consequences. Rather than diminishing our resolve, this unimaginable incident should reinvigorate and galvanize our concerted efforts towards strengthening international cooperation not only in combating terrorism, but also in promoting international peace and security for all States. It must also provide us with the necessary stimulus for political will and determination to break the impasse in multilateral efforts to further the cause of disarmament.

Mr. Noboru (Japan): At the outset, I should like to extend my warmest congratulations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee at this very important juncture. I am very confident that, with the benefit of your diplomatic experience and skill, the deliberations in the Committee will be most constructive and fruitful. I assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation as you discharge your responsibilities.

I was deeply horrified when I learned of the outrageous terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September, which caused unspeakable destruction and took the lives of countless innocent people. On behalf of the Government and the

people of Japan, I should like to express my profound condolences to the bereaved families of the victims. The horrific attacks have made it all too clear that now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, terrorism is a real and imminent threat, not only to the United States, but to every country throughout the world. The international community must be united in its determination to combat and eventually eradicate terrorism. Japan, for its part, has already announced several concrete and effective measures to enable it to contribute to the joint international efforts to respond to the recent terrorist attacks. It is, for example, taking the necessary legislative steps to dispatch its self-defence forces to provide support to the United States and other forces combating terrorism.

In the fight against terrorism, priority should be given to strengthening international law to bring terrorists to justice; to eradicating State-sponsored terrorism; and to further strengthening non-proliferation regimes to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. I highly appreciate Secretary-General Kofi Annan's address to the General Assembly on 1 October, in which he enumerated several very relevant measures in this regard. The concrete steps which Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala pointed out in his opening statement to the Committee also deserve serious attention.

In addition to the growing threat of terrorism, unresolved regional conflicts continue to take their toll and are potential destabilizing factors. Moreover, there is a realistic fear that these disputes could escalate to the point where weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, are used. The peaceful resolution of these conflicts is thus a high priority in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The primary concerns of the Committee, of course, are disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. Achievements in these areas will definitely contribute to global and regional security. Overall, however, the trends are not positive. Most notably, the Conference on Disarmament has not succeeded in commencing any substantive negotiations, despite the positive outcome of the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We are also gravely concerned about the lack of momentum towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is a linchpin for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It is truly regrettable that some States seem to be losing their political will to adhere to the Treaty.

I should now like to lay out some issues that the international community should address in order to reverse these negative trends and thus strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

First, it is imperative to redouble our efforts for the revitalization of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation norms. It is incumbent upon all States parties to strengthen the NPT regime as a top priority, by pursuing universal adherence to the NPT and by guaranteeing full compliance with it.

In this connection, Japan has taken initiatives to promote the universality of the IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement and its additional protocols. In June 2001 it hosted an international symposium in Tokyo to urge the Asia-Pacific countries to bring them into force. At the same time, it is of the utmost importance for the nuclear-weapon States to renew their commitment to, and demonstrate tangible progress in, nuclear disarmament by taking, in a timely manner, the practical steps related to article VI of the NPT, agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Above all, Japan attaches great importance to the early entry into force of the CTBT, the immediate commencement of the fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations and the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.

We believe that the CTBT is an important pillar of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, since it provides an essential means of constraining the development of nuclear weapons. We therefore urge all those who have not signed or ratified this Treaty to be attentive to the message that the conference for the facilitation of the entry into force of the CTBT will be setting forth in due course. We also stress the importance of maintaining the moratoriums on nuclear testing, pending the entry into force of the CTBT.

Japan very much welcomes the intensive consultations between Russia and the United States on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems in order to establish a new framework for strategic stability. We should like to engage in close dialogue with both States on those subjects. At the

same time, we hope that Russia and the United States will act expeditiously and take the necessary steps to reduce the number of their nuclear weapons, in the context of the new framework, to 2,000 and 2,500, respectively — the level to which both States agreed during the START process; hopefully, they will reduce them to an even lower level.

Japan would also like to participate constructively in the preparation for the NPT review process that will begin next spring with a view to ensuring the success of the Review Conference in 2005.

Despite the adverse trends in nuclear disarmament — perhaps I should say because of those trends — Japan is considering introducing, again this year, a resolution entitled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" to stress the need for swift implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We look forward to its adoption with the support of an overwhelming majority.

Secondly, we should not diminish our efforts to strengthen the biological and chemical weapons Conventions. Although the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was not able to reach agreement on a verification protocol by the target date this year, the States parties should continue to seek ways to enhance confidence in and compliance with the Convention. The forthcoming Review Conference should be an important occasion for the States parties to demonstrate their collective will to strengthen the Convention.

The recent terrorist attacks have reminded Japanese citizens of the horrific sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995. In order to prevent terrorists from using biological or chemical weapons, all States should tighten their national legislation and export controls on sensitive materials, equipment and technology related to such weapons.

Thirdly, the international community must create universal rules to prevent and curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a serious threat to world peace and stability. Leading the regional efforts in Asia, where ballistic missile proliferation directly affects its own security environment, Japan hosted in Tokyo this March the first ever discussion with Asian countries on international measures to cope with this issue. Japan will also continue to actively participate in the discussions on the international code of conduct and in the work of the United Nations panel of governmental experts on missiles in order to establish a multilateral framework to halt and reduce the threat of proliferation.

Fourthly, disarmament in the field of conventional weapons should also be pursued by the international community. The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which took place in July 2001, adopted a very significant Programme of Action. Japan will actively contribute to its implementation.

Japan has been active in Cambodia in the field of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and it now intends to extend cooperation and assistance to other countries and regions. My delegation, together with those of Colombia and South Africa, will also sponsor a resolution aimed at consolidating our efforts to follow up on the Conference. We will also organize a seminar on this matter early next year in Tokyo.

The Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, scheduled to take place in December, is expected to achieve significant results on such issues as the extension of the scope of application of the Convention and its Protocols to internal conflicts, explosive remnants of war and anti-vehicle mines. In this context, Japan has decided to co-sponsor the proposal to adopt a protocol which restricts the use of anti-vehicle mines. Furthermore, Japan will continue to urge those States which have not acceded to the Ottawa Convention to do so with a view to achieving a total and universal ban on anti-personnel mines.

Fifthly, Japan believes that it is critical for the Conference on Disarmament to continue its deliberations on its improved and more effective functioning next year in order to fulfil its role as the negotiating body on disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should consider significant reforms, including a review of its consensus rule, which is, in our view, too strict, and could discourage flexibility among member States. The reinvigoration of the Conference on Disarmament is an essential key to the revitalization of the multilateral disarmament process in its entirety.

Finally, I would like to offer a word of appreciation for the activities of the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament. I

personally attended the United Nations Disarmament Conferences held in Wellington in March and in Kanazawa, Japan, in August this year. Both Conferences were meaningful in encouraging regional discussions on disarmament and security issues and in enhancing public knowledge of related concerns. We look forward to the continuation of the active role of all three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament.

Mr. Khairat (Egypt) *(spoke in Arabic)*: It gives me great pleasure to convey to you, Sir, my sincere congratulations on your election as Chairman of the First Committee for this session, and also to congratulate the other members of the Bureau on their election.

At the outset, Egypt would like to reiterate its condemnation of the notorious terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September and its profound condolences to the American Administration and the American people.

Recently, we have witnessed expressions of international solidarity against terrorism in all its forms. An equal measure of impetus and strong international solidarity is now necessary to achieve further progress in disarmament efforts, to fulfil the commitments we have made and to strive to achieve the universality of disarmament treaties.

Over the past two years, we have witnessed widening differences among States on established and agreed priorities in the field of disarmament. The Secretary-General of the United Nations referred to these differences in paragraph 75 of his report on the work of the Organization. We therefore find it necessary to reaffirm the priorities of the international community in the field of disarmament. These were clearly established in the 1978 Final Document of the General Assembly's special session devoted to disarmament, which accorded absolute priority to efforts for disarmament in the area of nuclear weapons, followed by other weapons of mass destruction and, ultimately, by conventional weapons. This order of priority will continue to guide our work until nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their attendant dangers are totally eliminated. Here, we reiterate the need to agree on the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament at the earliest possible date.

The world today is facing numerous challenges in the field of disarmament. Attempts to modernize nuclear arsenals are continuing. The strategic situation is used by the major Powers as a pretext to continue with the arms race. Certain States continue to ignore the appeals of the international community to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and place their nuclear facilities under international supervision. Some States continue to adhere to the outdated doctrines of deterrence.

These challenges call for a collective response by the international community in order to have States honour commitments made. As a result, a number of initiatives have been launched for the elimination of nuclear weapons. They include the initiative of the New Agenda Coalition, of which Egypt is a member. This initiative and subsequent General Assembly resolutions have achieved marked success. The members of the Coalition played a distinctive role in the Sixth NPT Review Conference, which resulted in the adoption of 13 practical steps for the implementation of article VI of that Treaty, pertaining to the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Egypt will continue to play its role within the New Agenda Coalition as an expression of its deep commitment to nuclear disarmament and to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the dangers they pose.

Egypt regrets the continued failure by the Conference on Disarmament to agree on an agenda for the last five years. We also regret the lack of political will on the part of the five nuclear-weapon States to enter into meaningful, multilateral negotiations for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This lack of will is incompatible with the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States under article VI of the NPT as it is also incompatible with the Final Document of the Eighth Review Conference.

In this context, Egypt reaffirms that the approach of international action must be based on the following points:

First, there is a need to conclude a universal, non-discriminatory treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and a treaty on the prohibition of fissile materials, including their stockpiles.

Secondly, there is a need for international recognition that the use or threat of use of nuclear

weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

Thirdly, there is a need to establish international arrangements to ensure the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. We look forward to serious action in this direction at the Conference on Disarmament so as to arrive at arrangements that go beyond the scope of Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995). As such, they would comprise the elements of complete protection and necessary assistance and would thus enjoy both credibility and a deterrent character.

Fourthly, there is a need to deal seriously, within the Conference on Disarmament, with the question of the cessation of the arms race in outer space. We regret the failure of the Conference to deal with this matter. We reiterate the imperative need to put an end to the destructive arms race, which squanders human energy, before it spirals out of control. Egypt, along with Sri Lanka, will submit this year a draft resolution in this context.

The Middle East region continues to witness a clear imbalance. All States of the region have adhered to the NPT. They fulfil the commitments and obligations arising from this adherence. Nevertheless, Israel has chosen not to respond to the efforts under way in the region. It continues to cling to the nuclear option on the basis of outdated doctrines of deterrence. The international community remains silent. It has not insisted on the implementation of the numerous international resolutions that call on Israel to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The most recent of these resolutions was contained in the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the NPT.

Egypt will closely follow the implementation of the results of the Sixth Review Conference, which reaffirmed the importance of Israel's acceding to the NPT and placing all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards system of the IAEA. Egypt calls for a follow-up of the implementation of the results of that Conference, in accordance with the agreement reached in its Final Document. All States party to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other interested States, should submit their reports to the Preparatory Committee in its meeting to be held next April. These reports must contain the steps that States have taken towards the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

We reiterate Egypt's firm commitment to achieving the goals and principles of non-proliferation in the Middle East and in the world as a whole. We are keenly aware that facing the menace of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is an urgent task that brooks no delay. It was on the basis of this profound belief that in April 1990 President Hosni Mubarak launched his initiative on turning the Middle East into a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. This was a natural extension of Egypt's call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

In June 1998, President Mubarak launched his more comprehensive initiative on the holding of an international conference on freeing the world of all weapons of mass destruction, foremost of these being nuclear weapons. This initiative is in consonance with the United Nations Secretary-General's call for the convening of a major international conference to consider ways to eliminate nuclear risks.

There have been many initiatives and numerous international resolutions calling for rendering the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and they all enjoy international support. Nevertheless, Israel has not yet responded to the demand of the international community that it adhere to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system. Nor has it responded to regional or international suggestions and endeavours to begin serious negotiations on the procedural and substantive aspects of ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This makes us all the more determined to make serious and effective progress to shield the Middle East region from the horror of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Egypt participates in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects. We believe that the study of this question must be comprehensive; it must not be confined to certain aspects of the missile issue. Egypt stresses that any consideration of the issue of missiles must take place within the United Nations. It must be borne in mind

that any attempt to deal with this subject outside the Organization is doomed to certain failure.

The question of transparency in armaments continues to be dealt with in a way that is inconsistent with resolution 46/36 L, which established the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Shortcomings and ambiguities still plague the work of the Register. In our view, transparency in armaments should encompass all types of weapons and their technologies, including weapons of mass destruction, in addition to military holdings and procurement through national production. It is a mistake to limit this to certain types of weapons and to exclude others.

In the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference, the States parties reiterated the need for the nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency with regard to nuclear weapon capability and implementation of agreements, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. Those very same States are the ones that are opposing this call here. This dichotomy raises questions in our minds about the seriousness of some of the positions taken by States on this subject.

Egypt welcomes the success of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons and the agreement on the Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade of these arms. It is our hope that the Programme, which my country supports, will contribute to the elimination of this problem, which threatens the lives and security of civilian populations. While fully understanding the wish of some affected States to see this question move beyond the regional level to occupy a place on the list of international priorities, we cannot overlook the fact that international action in this regard is governed by a certain clearly agreed order of priorities, as was mentioned earlier.

Egypt has suffered, and continues to suffer, from the problem of landmines for the last 50 years. The warring parties in the Second World War planted nearly 23 million landmines on Egyptian territory. Therefore, we approach this landmine problem from a practical and realistic point of view, rather than from an abstract one. We see it through the prism of suffering that has lasted for more than five decades, during which thousands of lives have been lost.

Egypt has stated its position on the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of landmines in various international forums. I need not state it again. Egypt's position will remain unchanged, despite our appreciation for the humanitarian objective of the Convention. This is due to the severe shortcomings of the Convention and because it does not take Egypt's concerns into account and fails to deal with all the aspects of the problem.

Mr. Ulland (Norway): I would like to join previous speakers in congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee and assure you of Norway's full support and cooperation.

The appalling act of terror that struck this city and Washington, D.C., on 11 September gives cause for the strongest condemnation and our full solidarity with the American people and the United States Government. This attack has demonstrated the need for international coalition-building and a determined effort to combat terrorism. We are all affected by the events of 11 September. That is why we must make common cause of the fight against international terrorism.

The work of this Committee is highly relevant to our efforts to make the world a safer place. Weapons of mass destruction could pose an even darker threat in the hands of terrorists. We are convinced that close international cooperation and a multilateral approach to non-proliferation and disarmament are essential if we wish to reduce the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and the terrorist threat to international peace and security. Our response to those who disrupt and destroy should be a new resolve to make fuller use of the United Nations, to break the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and to strengthen the international non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. This is the time not for business as usual in dealing with non-proliferation and disarmament, but for a radical look at how peace and security can best be assured in the new millennium.

We already have a broad framework to build on, which consists of multilateral and bilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Effective implementation and continued strengthening of these regimes must form an integral part of any future strategy. We need to make a fresh effort for universal adherence to key existing treaties, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). And we need to establish new regimes

to address new issues, such as the production of weapons-grade fissile material, the proliferation of ballistic missiles, a verification and control regime to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention and measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Let me focus briefly on a number of issues we believe are highly important to address at this stage. The landmark outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference set the international community an ambitious nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda for the next five years. The Final Document identified 13 steps for the systematic and progressive achievement of nuclear disarmament. But progress has been disappointingly slow since then. Let us make use of this session of the First Committee to reconfirm our commitment to the NPT plan of action and to take steps to make the first preparatory committee in April 2002 a success.

One of the agreed steps in the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference is the early entry into force and the full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible, while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) as a cornerstone for strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons. We welcome the signs that the United States and Russia are prepared to considerably reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals. We will welcome deep cuts, and we prefer to see such reductions enshrined in formal, verifiable agreements. This would be in line with the principles of irreversibility and transparency of the NPT Final Document.

We believe that continuation of the ABM Treaty, in an adjusted form if necessary, or the establishment of a similar and agreed framework, is important for maintaining global strategic stability. We hope the United States and Russia will be able to reach mutual understanding on the elements of a new strategic framework, which will take into consideration the security concerns of all nations that are affected by the relations between those two countries.

The NPT Final Document called for steps by the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce their arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. We continue to stress the need for further reductions in these arsenals and for increased transparency. We note in this context that NATO recently proposed a set of transparency measures to Russia, and we support efforts by NATO and Russia, and the United States and Russia, to pursue a dialogue on this important subject.

The proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction is causing growing international concern, and a number of initiatives have been undertaken to curb and reverse this trend. The emphasis must be on a broad approach and a comprehensive strategy. Political, economic and diplomatic means are all important in this respect. Global and multilateral steps are needed. Norway supports the establishment of an international code of conduct as a basis for strengthened international efforts in this field, and we encourage all countries to join this important initiative. We look forward to receiving the report of the United Nations panel of governmental experts on missiles before the next session of the General Assembly.

Negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty continues to be a key priority for Norway within the Conference on Disarmament. If we are confident that no new fissile material for nuclear weapons will be produced, this will facilitate the efforts to ensure effective and verifiable disarmament. Negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty would be an extremely important non-proliferation measure. We therefore make an urgent appeal to all States to contribute to overcoming the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament. This would be a clear sign that it is not just business as usual in the wake of 11 September, but that a new political will has been created. Pending such a development, we welcome activities outside the Conference on Disarmament that can help maintain interest in and expertise on issues related to the fissile material cut-off treaty and that can be useful in preparing future negotiations in the Conference.

Norway attaches the greatest importance to achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its early entry into force. Bringing the Treaty into force will be essential for broader efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. The upcoming article XIV Conference should be instrumental in achieving this end.

Verification is the key to the effectiveness of all arms control and disarmament treaties. Norway has

made a substantial contribution to CTBT verification. We are hosting and running six facilities in the International Monitoring System. We have a strong interest in the early entry into force of the Treaty. We look forward to the continued cooperation and support of all signatory and ratifying States in the build-up of all the elements of the CTBT's verification system.

The position of the nuclear Powers is crucial to the CTBT. Self-imposed moratoriums on nuclear testing are a useful measure pending the entry into force of the Treaty, but cannot replace the legally binding commitments represented by signing and ratification. We were disappointed by the recent announcement by the United States that it is to withdraw from certain activities under the Treaty and not reconsider its position on ratification. We appeal to all countries that have not done so to sign and ratify the Treaty unconditionally and without delay, and hope in particular that the United States and China will soon follow the United Kingdom, France and Russia.

We are strongly committed to the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and expect full and effective implementation of its provisions by all States parties. Another landmark treaty in the international non-proliferation regime is the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Norway is giving high priority to the efforts to achieve an effective protocol to strengthen this Convention, which should include mechanisms for verification and confidence-building. A multilateral, legally binding instrument is needed to fill the existing gap in the non-proliferation regime. We regret the lack of results in the Ad Hoc Group in Geneva so far. Despite the lack of an agreed protocol after six years of negotiations, we believe we still have a vehicle that could bring the process forward. The Ad Hoc Group's mandate remains in force. We should therefore make use of the Review Conference in November to reconfirm the States parties' commitment to the aims set out in the mandate.

Let me now turn from the weapons of mass destruction to the weapons that are responsible for the largest number of casualties. Norway welcomes the Programme of Action agreed at the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in July. Even though the outcome could have been more ambitious in certain respects, we believe that the Programme of Action is a good starting point and a foundation on which we can build. We hope that the General Assembly will confirm and consolidate the Programme of Action, so that we can focus on active follow-up and implementation. To be successful in our efforts, we need to mobilize Governments and civil society, the United Nations and its agencies, regional organizations and the non-governmental organizations. We look forward to concrete follow-up measures from the Secretary-General. We believe that the first meeting of States should take place in 2003. We welcome the Security Council's involvement and the decision to request a report by September next year on how the Council can help prevent and combat the illicit trade in small arms.

In our national efforts we will give high priority to assisting affected countries and regions. A United Nations feasibility study on an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace illicit arms should be undertaken as soon as possible, and governmental experts should be nominated in the course of this year. We want to work with interested Governments and NGOs to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation on brokering. We believe that international instruments on tracing and brokering should be the ultimate aim of these efforts.

Norway continues to have a strong commitment to the implementation of the Convention banning anti-personnel mines. We have come a long way towards universalization and in implementation of the Convention in a short time. We are pleased to see a decrease in the use of mines as well as in the number of new mine victims and countries producing anti-personnel mines. The active participation of the mine-affected countries and NGOs in particular through the International Campaign to Ban Landmines is impressive and most encouraging.

Despite these positive developments, anti-personnel mines continue to maim people and threaten societies in many countries and to undermine efforts to achieve social and economic progress. Mine clearance and awareness, assistance to victims and stockpile destruction must continue. Norway maintains its commitment to allocate $120 million over a five-year period to practical mine action activities. We congratulate the Government of Nicaragua on organizing the successful Third Meeting of the States parties to the Convention. Nicaragua will introduce the draft resolution on the implementation of the Ottawa Convention in the Committee this year, and we ask all delegations to support it. We align ourselves with the comprehensive statement of the European Union on

this subject and have also associated ourselves with the European Union intervention in general.

Norway welcomes initiatives aimed at minimizing the humanitarian problems caused by the indiscriminate effects of weapons in conflicts. We support proposals to extend the scope of application of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to include internal conflicts. We are also in favour of proposals to improve the standard of weapons and extend the Convention to cover new types of weapons and munitions.

In this connection, I commend the International Committee of the Red Cross for its active role in drawing attention to the issue of explosive remnants of war. Recent conflicts have confirmed that this is an enormous humanitarian problem. We believe it needs to be addressed urgently and in a credible way. Norway thus supports the idea of a new protocol to the CCW that specifically aims to reduce the indiscriminate effects of explosive remnants of war. The upcoming Review Conference should mandate a group of governmental experts to look into the various aspects and make proposals. A time-frame for the group's work would be helpful. This will clearly be in line with the Convention's objective, and may also contribute to a much needed revitalization of the CCW.

Extraordinary circumstances call for extraordinary efforts to eliminate threats from weapons of mass destruction. In the aftermath of the senseless terrorist attack on the United States it is more important than ever to make progress in the areas of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. My delegation is looking forward to working closely and constructively with other delegations to achieve this in the time ahead.

Mr. Vega (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like first to congratulate you, Sir, and your Bureau on your election. We wish you every success.

Since this is the first time that my delegation has taken the floor on its own behalf, allow me to assure you of the full participation of Chile in the common, collective task that lies before us. This task is to jointly promote increasingly higher levels of human security for individuals, communities, nations and all of humanity. In this endeavour, you can rely on our unswerving commitment and support.

In addition to positions stated in the Declaration of the Rio Group, my country would like to emphasize a few aspects of a political nature.

Our debate today is taking place in the midst of a watershed event in our search for complete and non-discriminatory security — a security that permits persons, regardless of their sex, age, nationality, religion, culture, language, political ideas, colour or ethnic origin, or indeed of any characterization, to aspire to live their lives under basic conditions of certainty and peace.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were a watershed experience in many respects. They have demonstrated to us in a tragic, real and definitive way some of the negative dimensions of globalization. Along with condemnation of the acts and solidarity with the United States and the thousands of innocent persons affected, there has emerged a powerful desire to ensure that terrorism does not impose its logic and its laws. That is why 11 September is a watershed experience. The attacks were a crime against the United States and humanity, as well as against the fundamental principles of liberty, democracy, justice and the rule of law. As many others have stated in recent days, these are not solely Western principles; they are the foundations of a just, humane and decent society in any religion or cultural tradition. Our country wishes to reiterate here the view it has already stated, and which it will continue to express tirelessly: there is no neutrality when faced with those who place themselves outside the basic human framework of norms necessary for any form of social coexistence.

Nevertheless, like all tragedies, this one also presents an opportunity to learn lessons that can guide us to paths leading to the peace and justice we hope for. We know today that the fate of each of our countries is the fate of all the peoples of the world; and that this is a world in which no one can live alone, without regard for the fears, concerns and problems of others. The United Nations is the foremost universal Organization, the place where mankind can pursue the development and expansion of human rights, solidarity and cooperation. It is an institution that recognizes the principle of the equality of all its Members and attaches dignity to their values, needs, hopes and sufferings.

Terrorism is precisely the opposite of those common aspirations. It is a nightmare that seeks to

replace politics and the search for peace with the blind force of violence, and justice and the celebration of life with radicalism and the indiscriminate sweep of death.

The most important common element in all the reactions that have been expressed is the conviction that the terrorists attacked not only the United States but all civilizations, and all of us who comprise this complex and diverse reality that is humankind. It is this aspect that justifies and demands collective action, within the framework of law and using multilateral instruments, which serve to better shape the international community's actions.

In his letter of 11 September addressed to the President of the United States, President Ricardo Lagos Escobar of Chile stated that

> "We cannot, and must not, falter in the fight against terrorism. It is the responsibility of the international community ... Chile will do all within its power to contribute to the eradication of this senseless policy of terrorism from the international arena".

It is from this perspective that we wish to look critically at the work done in the area of security and disarmament during the past year, between the fifty-fifth and fifty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly.

I believe that it is a generally held view in this room that this year has been a disappointing one. The Conference on Disarmament, which is the only forum available to the international community to negotiate universal arms control instruments, has been incapable of agreeing upon a programme of work for the fourth consecutive year. As a result, negotiations on a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for military purposes have not begun, although there is consensus in the Conference regarding such a mandate. Nor has it been possible to implement a mandate on a discussion of nuclear disarmament within a subsidiary organ of the Conference — a discussion that, by its very nature, cannot but be understood as a stage prior to negotiations — in other words, a pre-negotiation phase. In our view, that is an essential step towards translating into action — as stated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) —

> "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI". (*NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), p. 14, para. 6)*

Part of the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament involves issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. My country believes that this is a real issue that cannot be ignored, and one on which we should begin an exchange of views in the spirit established by the Amorim proposal for the programme of work.

Chile is convinced of the importance of the Conference on Disarmament as an instrument of the international community to create better security conditions for all the inhabitants of the world. Moreover, we believe that it represents a store of experience for the cause of disarmament in the world that cannot, and should not, be wasted. We therefore welcome the positive signs noted by Ambassador Camilo Reyes during his chairmanship, when he succeeded in appointing three special coordinators to review the agenda of the Conference and the issue of enlarging its membership, and to consider ways to make it function better and more efficiently.

We wish to reaffirm the position we expressed, when we had the honour of chairing the Conference this year, on the need to continue our efforts to break the stalemate in the Conference and not to allow an attitude of abandonment to take root and lead to the "death" of the Conference. If the Conference did not exist, we would be working towards its creation.

On the basis of Chile's strict respect for international law, we again stress the value of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in which it emphasized the

> "obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". (*A/51/218, annex, p. 37*)

This Advisory Opinion constitutes a solid doctrinal base that should not be disregarded. We are faced here with an important link between questions of disarmament law and humanitarian law.

In the work on the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, we have seen the long and arduous process aimed at strengthening

the Convention through the adoption of a verification protocol come to a halt. The strenuous and commendable efforts of Ambassador Tibor Tóth to achieve consensus on his compromise text were fruitless, and the process itself degenerated into an unnecessary and sterile confrontation. Achieving the task of lending credibility to the prohibition of the development, production, use and transfer of biological weapons is today more distant than ever.

The muted expressions of satisfaction produced by the outcome of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects can turn into real satisfaction only when we see sure progress being made towards the implementation of the Ottawa Convention. However, much still remains to be done to provide relief to peoples affected by crime and armed conflicts, which feed on the unregulated circulation of such weapons. Chile has stressed on more than one occasion the need to severely limit the manufacture and illicit trade in these weapons.

Given that this is an issue very closely linked to human suffering, we must favour restrictions that protect life over the pure and simple freedom of trade. We agree with the Secretary-General that there are potential benefits for mankind in establishing controls on the private ownership of such weapons and prohibitions against their transfer to non-State entities. That cannot possibly be more obvious today, after what we have just experienced.

As we stated at the Conference on Disarmament, the Ottawa Convention stands out as an alternative example of what it is possible to achieve in the field of international security and disarmament. The Convention shows that small and medium-sized States can achieve the critical mass necessary to produce results that improve the lives of millions of human beings.

I have the honour to announce that, on 10 September 2001, Chile deposited with the Secretary-General its instrument of ratification of this Convention. I wish to note that at the ceremony were representatives of Canada and Norway, States that campaigned vigorously for the Convention and with which we share a set of common values in the field of human security. We wish to reiterate our commitment to the idea of making our region a zone free of this type of weapon, and we stress the need to achieve the universality of the Convention.

With regard to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, it is clear that there is a need to recognize the importance of the security of the international maritime transport of radioactive wastes and spent nuclear fuel. Chile has been among the countries that have worked hard to keep that concern alive in the First Committee and in various other forums. We believe that this issue too is related to international security. For that reason, and because earlier this year we again noted such movements along our coast, we want to reaffirm the need to continue to take steps to regulate these activities, steps commensurate with the highest applicable levels of security.

A moment ago I spoke of the opportunities that can be created by a watershed experience, especially one like the events that took place in New York but a few weeks ago. In our view, the condemnation and sympathy aroused by the terrorist attacks against the United States confirm the transcendent value of solidarity. The fight against terrorism is an international task, and it must be closely linked to our common effort to attain human security, something that goes beyond the security of States and to which disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation all contribute.

It is true that we have reached a watershed in our collective search for human security. But this will be a positive moment only if we rediscover and place new value on international solidarity, which can be most effectively channelled, politically, legally and socially, through multilateralism. There is a road that leads to multilateralism and another that leads away from it. The dynamics of international relations always leave room for manoeuvre that enables us to take the second road. But it is also true that by taking that road we can abandon multilateralism to a degree that flies in the face of political common sense. And I am sure that all of us in this room favour the elimination of political folly.

As we have stated elsewhere, Chile participates actively in multilateral forums on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation based on the principle of the indivisibility of international security, according to which all States, regardless of their size and influence, bear a share of the responsibility for global security. The terrorist acts of Tuesday, 11 September, made us

reflect on the principle of the indivisibility of international security on the basis of facts that lead to paradoxical conclusions.

The first is that any international actor that is sufficiently determined — and terrorist groups fall within that category — can inflict unacceptable damage on global security. Globalization merely magnifies the damage caused by such acts, which have claimed victims from many different nationalities. The cult of death as an instrument of power, contempt for law and a rejection of the simple definition of democracy offered by Karl Popper — a system that offers the possibility of change without bloodshed — are no justification for any cause.

Perhaps the most dangerous threats to global security are right before our eyes within the confines of a daily reality of conflict that the media transmit into the privacy of our own homes. There, the scenarios of real violence are less glamorous and less tragic than others that remain in the realm of the imagination. It might be prudent to take a just and balanced look at those conflicts and seek political solutions to them. And here we must stress once again that nothing justifies or could justify terrorist violence. Even so, any strategy to combat terrorism that fails to recognize it as a symptom of other more complex political, social and even cultural problems could degenerate into the pursuit of the effects of terrorism while overlooking the breeding grounds in which that phenomenon flourishes.

It is precisely for that reason, and as a consequence of the effective application of the principle of the indivisibility of international security, that we must at this painful time commit ourselves firmly to multilateralism, value it as the appropriate instrument for confronting any threats to global security and return with renewed and positive political will to the multilateral disarmament agenda.

If that is the result of our work during this session of the First Committee, we will have done a great service to the security of all mankind and we will have taken a giant step towards the eradication of all political folly.

Mr. Niehaus (Costa Rica) (*spoke in Spanish*): I wish first of all, Sir, to congratulate you and your country, Hungary, on your well-deserved election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. We are certain that your well known ability and experience will lead us to success. I assure you of my delegation's continuing full cooperation. Our congratulations go also to the other members of the Bureau. I wish further to thank the previous Chairman, Ambassador U Mya Than of Myanmar, for his signal contribution during the fifty-fifth session.

My delegation endorses the statement made on Monday by the Permanent Representative of Chile on behalf of the Rio Group, to which we are proud to belong.

As we consider disarmament and international security agenda items today, we cannot fail to think of the contemptible, criminal terrorist attacks of 11 September. Costa Rica categorically and firmly condemns those criminal, barbaric acts that are contrary to fundamental human values, and reiterates its heartfelt condolences to the United States and to all the other nations that fell victim to that tragedy.

There is an obvious link between terrorism and weaponry. To commit terrorist attacks, it is indispensable to possess weapons. The proliferation of arms stokes the fires of violence, fuels conflict and hatred and exacerbates criminality. Weapons are not merely a catalyst in armed conflict; they also constitute an obstacle to the peace process. The indiscriminate sale of weapons encourages and promotes political instability and the violation of human rights; these in turn give rise to demands within societies, which tend to be advanced through violence.

Fighting terrorism thus requires a new commitment to disarmament. We must explicitly prohibit the transfer of weapons to extremist, terrorist or rebel groups. We must also forbid the transfer of weapons to Governments that support or harbour terrorist groups, Governments that violate human rights and those that do not respect democratic principles. We must guarantee that properly authorized arms transfers are not diverted to illicit goals. To eradicate terrorism, it is essential to regulate civilian possession of light weapons.

In that connection, I cannot fail to mention the Programme of Action adopted at last July's United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. To be frank, my delegation was disappointed in the outcome of that conference. We are concerned that arms transfers to rebel groups were not prohibited; we are outraged that there was no condemnation of the transfer of arms to Governments that commit massive or systematic

violations of human rights. We are alarmed too that it was not possible to adopt strong measures to regulate civilian possession of weapons. Recent events illustrate the lack of wisdom and vision demonstrated in the negotiations. But there is still time to correct those mistakes. We must begin to formulate a legally binding code of conduct regulating arms transfers, which would prevent the perpetration of further terrorist acts and the spawning of new armed conflicts.

In the medium and the long term, the quest for peace and security requires a substantial reduction in the number of available weapons. The weapons culture, in all its forms, runs counter to the principles of peace, security and development that must guide international relations in the modern world. The accumulation of weapons and ammunition poses a genuine obstacle to peace and a direct threat to the security of all truly peace-loving nations, such as mine.

Combating the use, abuse and proliferation of weapons requires the demilitarization of our societies and the development of a genuine culture of peace and life based on greater economic and social equality, the rule of law, democracy, representative government and respect for human rights.

Over the past 50 years, disarmament has been a central element of daily life in Costa Rica. Our country has no weapons and no army. We do not ensure our national security through the use of weapons. Quite the contrary: the sole guarantee of our security is the prohibition of the use of force, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. We have entrusted our security to this Organization and multilateral mechanisms.

Cost Rica firmly supports the various efforts under way to eradicate definitively all types of weapons. We therefore endorse the conclusions of the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Manufacturing and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and On Their Destruction, held in September last in Managua, Nicaragua.

We deem it necessary in particular for the international community to continue its support for demining programmes and for programmes to assist mine victims and to educate the populations at risk.

My country recognizes, and is itself a victim of, the threat posed by transnational crime to small and vulnerable countries. That is why we support the initiative of the Small Island States to eradicate criminal activities that threaten their stability and security. In particular, we support their initiative that the Caribbean be declared a zone of peace.

My delegation condemns in all circumstances the use, possession, threat of use and development of nuclear weapons. We believe that from an ethical, legal and strategic point of view, there is no rationale whatsoever for these instruments of mass destruction. No State has the right to endanger the survival of the human race. That is why we call on the nuclear-weapon States to make a genuine commitment to disarmament negotiations and to initiate a progressive and systematic process of dismantling of their arsenals.

We also urge those States not to transfer to other States any technology or materials that promote the development of nuclear weapons. We also reiterate our appeal to the nuclear Powers to exercise the greatest possible prudence in the handling of their nuclear arsenals in order to avoid new sources of tension or mistrust.

Along these lines, we remain concerned about that design and study of anti-missile defence systems. In this context, I am pleased to announce that on 25 September Costa Rica ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We appeal to all States that have not yet done so to do so promptly. We believe that the entry into force of this international instrument is an indispensable step towards ensuring the security of all humankind.

Costa Rica, as a member of the nuclear-weapon-free zone of Latin America established through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, firmly supports the creation and consolidation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, because we believe they make a positive contribution to global peace and security. In this respect, we fully support the Rio Group's communiqué on the transport of radioactive materials and dangerous waste products.

During our discussions in the Committee, we must bear in mind the multifaceted and positive relationship between disarmament and development. Reducing military expenditures is particularly important for developing countries. We have scant resources available to us, and we cannot mismanage them while maintaining armies that place a heavy burden on our budget.

Our national experience has demonstrated that not investing in arms is the best decision for countries genuinely committed to the well-being of their citizens. We therefore advocate that the resources that today are allocated to weapons throughout the world be redirected to promoting genuine, authentic economic and social development as well as genuine equity among all peoples.

Peace is not just the absence of armed conflict. Genuine peace is the fruit of harmony among the various sectors of society. Respectful relationships among individuals and among peoples and the rejection of violence and hatred.

Peace requires active solidarity among men and women, and that is why peace can exist only when we recognize that, as human beings, we all are members of the same family, and disarmament is only the first step in that direction.

Mr. Westdal (Canada): Mr. Chairman, congratulations on your election and on your conduct of the chairmanship of our Committee. We have worked under your leadership and under that of other Hungarian representatives in this field before, and we are grateful, confident and content to see your clear fidelity to its traditional high standards.

We are gathered in the shadow of massive tragedy — mass murder by people who think that they can cow us. Terrorism is not an act, but an effect. When we give in, the terrorists win. But far from terrorized, we are resolute. Stirred by tragedy, conscious that we are on the cusp of a new chapter in history, we will henceforth be vigilant, coherent and energetic in our fight against terrorism. Far from being divided, our nations are united, as never before, in the face of a common enemy.

I speak now of the meaning of our Committee's work, which my delegation draws from that dreadful day when this United Nations, this house of the whole world, bore the dust of death.

It is, in sum, our appreciation that there is new human unity on this earth; that we are all together seized with purpose and resolve by our shared imperative to destroy terrorism; that the fight enlists us all in multilateralism, with grave responsibility to make it work; that we must reinforce our defences against the dangers and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; that this Committee has a mandate and an agenda for deliberations full of relevance and urgent work in non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament; and that, in greater earnest than ever before, we need to get on with it.

We first relearn the great lesson that we are all one people, all part of a planetary civilization. On television, live, real-time, we have seen our vulnerability. The images shook the whole world as never before — and as one. But that very integrity, that oneness, is also our redeeming strength. That unity encompasses all nations and peoples, transcending regions, religions, and any and all divisions. It is the foundation for a new, deeper collective responsibility to make this a safer world.

The attacks and our response have been profoundly humanizing for the world community, evoking the very best of the human spirit in New York and far beyond, and confirming values and interests all here share. Ironically, the very last thing those terrorists would have wanted to do is give us all unity of spirit, purpose and resolve against them, but unity has been our first response to their atrocity. The attack and our common reaction are both milestones — one bloody, one brave.

The surge towards global human unity is palpable. It is also timely. For more than 50 years now, we have struggled to find ways to achieve that measure of global political coherence required to survive the grave risks posed by weapons of mass destruction, thermonuclear bombs foremost among them, whose blasts are thousands of times more powerful than those of 11 September — arsenals that could lead to human extinction. We do not yet know just which combination of global institutions and nation-States will achieve that end, nor just how that combination will be checked and balanced, but we do know that our new, deeper unity will help us gain that ground.

The second lesson we learn is that civilization, all of us — States, institutions, groups and individuals — must recognize and combat the common enemy we face in any group or person prepared to use the means of modern technology for mass murder.

Success will require much closer cooperation among States, without exception. As was made clear in the General Assembly's debate last week and in Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), what has changed in our world is that anti-terrorism is now foremost on the agenda of all States.

We are all united and solemnly agreed now that no State anywhere, anytime, is any longer allowed to abide, abet, help or harbour terrorists plotting mass murder. Human unity is deepened with this purpose.

The third lesson we draw is that the vital interests of all States without exception lie in effective multilateralism. To protect ourselves, all of us, we need rules — and they need keeping. Vital to the protection of modern civilization, multilateral security institutions matter now more than ever before.

We have surely learned that no single nation, however powerful, can hope to ensure its security unilaterally. Given the stakes, we have also learned that, in the multilateral agreements and institutions we have built to protect our security, we can no longer pretend, make promises we do not keep or spout empty words. We need those institutions held to strict standards of legitimacy and effectiveness. They must earn their keep and add real value or be replaced with new means to get their jobs done.

In the fields of First Committee work, that means universal adherence to and full implementation of multilateral security treaties. It means transparency, verification and credible enforcement of arms pacts. It means strong nuclear safeguards and more resources for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It means more money for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). It means the actual elimination of stocks of weapons of mass destruction, including fissile materials. It means a stronger Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and action to counter the dangers in easily constructed radiological weapons, which spread radioactive material by conventional explosions. And it means robust export controls on weapons, related technology and dual-use items. It is a tall order, but the fact is that if we do nothing more than keep the promises we have already made and implement fully and rigorously the treaties we have already negotiated, we will have taken a major step forward.

It is also surely time to put the Conference on Disarmament back to work. In that institution, we have well-proven means to negotiate binding accords. Canadian and other Conference Presidents have done their utmost to spur Governments to joint action dealing with fissile material negotiations, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We have been very close to agreement on a programme of valuable work. The time has come to agree and get moving.

On reviewing the business of our Committee in the baleful light of horror, we learn our fourth lesson: that our agenda is full of global imperative, full of urgent relevance in non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. If the people, civil societies and Governments of the world, anxious now with compelling reason, cannot turn to this Committee to define and seek "security for all" — in the language of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — where can they turn? For urgent deliberation on danger clear and present to us all, they look to us. And they look to us to focus on a real agenda, on what matters to their security and safety. We have to establish priorities and allocate our time on the basis of the real merits of the various proposals before us.

The first priority, surely, is nuclear disarmament, the fulfilment of our solemn pledge to rid the world of nuclear weapons. We already have a template, the NPT plan of action — 13 practical steps agreed by all the parties to the NPT last year and endorsed by the General Assembly — and we have the unequivocal commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil it, along with a renewed promise of accountability. We need to protect those valuable assets and to use them in years to come to sustain the NPT's vital protections for us all. To strengthen the NPT's norm, we reiterate the call by the NPT Review Conference for those few States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States.

That nuclear disarmament commitment applies to both horizontal and vertical proliferation of existing arsenals. It surely means no more nuclear weapons tests. We need neither further demonstrations nor further refinements of their catastrophic force. The moratorium on tests must endure and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) must come into force. Moreover, we need to make sure that stockpiles are secure and launch negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, with parallel attention to stocks, and we need to focus on tactical as well as strategic weapons. In sum, we need firm control of all nuclear weapons and materials; we need strict non-proliferation; and we need their incremental reduction and their ultimate elimination.

Through much of this year, we have been considering the adaptation of the global strategic framework to dynamic circumstances and emerging threats to stability and security. Throughout the debate and the consultations in which we have been involved, Canada has recognized the need for adaptation, while emphasizing the need to maintain, match or enhance the benefits of existing arrangements. If the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is to be amended or replaced, it would be important that the new strategic framework make a comparably strong contribution to global security. We have also emphasized the protection of the existing rules-based non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime, which has fostered the successful pursuit of global restraint and strategic stability for more than three decades. The principles at the base of that regime — transparency, verification, irreversibility and respect for treaty commitments — are as valid today as ever before.

Further in the same framework, we have emphasized the need to keep space free of weapons. Outer space remains the only environment where weapons are not present; hence the importance and urgency of preventative diplomacy to forestall an arms race in outer space by establishing a multilateral ban on space-based weapons.

We should consider with great care the geostrategic implications of missile defence deployment and, more generally, we must seek to adapt security frameworks in a way that

> "promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all", (*NPT/CONF.2000/28, vol. I, Part I, p. 15*)

to quote the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We must sustain a strategic framework in which peace radiates through multilateral security structures faithfully supported by all States.

Canada will chair the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) through the coming year. We fully subscribe to the MTCR's preventive approach to the clear dangers of missile proliferation and will devote great energy as its Chair to reach out to non-member States. We also strongly support the draft international code of conduct on missiles, originally crafted by the MTCR in consultation with non-members, but now independent of the Regime and released for consideration by the international community as a whole. The universalization of the draft code should take place through a transparent and inclusive negotiating process open to all States on the basis of equality. Finally, we support other initiatives designed to focus multilateral attention on missile issues in all their aspects, including the United Nations group of experts established earlier this year, of which Canada is a member.

We will also have before us texts on other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, like many other States parties, Canada had hoped that the Review Conference of the States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention later this year would be able to adopt a compliance protocol strengthening global norms against the possession of biological weapons through an effective multilateral instrument providing means to investigate allegations of non-compliance, to complicate and deter biological weapons proliferation and to reduce the risks of the weaponization of disease.

The potential linkages to terrorism are clear and disturbing. Unfortunately, the Ad Hoc Group has failed to report. The threat of biological weapons, though, equally unfortunately, has not disappeared. Indeed, our Governments face growing public concern. At the Review Conference, we will examine with great interest any and all proposals to serve our common, primary goal of reinforcing the Convention and preventing the possession and use of biological weapons.

As to chemical weapons, we have been heartened by the strength of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the demonstrated potential of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to ensure its effective implementation. In less than five years, the Convention's operations have proven the feasibility of stringent verification through detailed reporting and on-site monitoring. As well, stockpiles of chemical weapons are being destroyed. There is much more to be done, though, and it is ever more important that we eradicate stocks and ensure their strict control and security until they are destroyed. The OPCW's drive against chemical weapons obviously needs more funding. Moreover, some States have not adhered to the Convention yet. We need them all on board.

(*spoke in French*)

Finally, I address the weapons that have been doing the mass of the killing on Earth these last decades: small arms, as well as light weapons and anti-personnel mines and other conventional weapons that

remain as explosive remnants long after conflicts have ended.

The tragedy of 11 September notwithstanding, small arms remain the weapons most commonly used by terrorists and other non-State perpetrators of mass violence. We need to improve our security by curbing the proliferation of small arms and reducing their numbers. We can start very well by implementing the Programme of Action adopted at the United Nations Conference on small arms last July. While more could have been accomplished, the achievement was not negligible: the first global acceptance that small arms menace both international and human security and that Governments are responsible for solutions. To help keep the promises in that Programme, we count on the First Committee for impetus.

We know well that anti-personnel mines devastate the lives of individuals, communities and States. To counter the terror of these weapons, more than 120 States have now accepted the Ottawa Convention. With its comprehensive ban on anti-personnel mines and its provisions for cooperation and assistance, the Convention has undoubtedly been a success, as underlined last month at the Third Meeting of States Parties, held, fittingly, in Nicaragua, one of the most mine-affected States in the Americas. The job, though, is far from done. Canada calls on all States — including the three permanent members of the Security Council that have not yet acceded to the Ottawa Convention — to join this common effort.

(*spoke in English*)

While the international community has done much to ameliorate the humanitarian impact of anti-personnel mines, our work to lessen the terror of war for civilian populations, for peacekeepers and for humanitarian workers should not stop there. We need to deal with other explosive remnants of war. At the conference late this year to review the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, we can find ways to prevent munitions from becoming unexploded ordnance in the first place, ways to clear infested terrain and ways to warn citizens of danger. Such essential progress is well within our grasp.

I close by affirming that in all settings and at every opportunity Canada will keep seeking a safer path forward. We shall be vigilant and active in all the security institutions in which we take part — from the First Committee to the Missile Technology Control Regime, from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the CTBT Organization, from NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to the G8, over which we will preside next year.

Canadians have fought and died for freedom before, and we shall fight again as need be for our freedom to cherish life here, now, on this still gorgeous earth.

Mr. Šepelák (Czech Republic): It is with special pleasure that I congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the Committee. Your task will not be an easy one, but I am convinced that you will manage the work entrusted you with all the diplomatic skills and qualities necessary for achieving the best possible result of our work. My delegation is committed to cooperating with you towards this end.

The Czech Republic aligned itself with the statement made by the representative of Belgium on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries. Nevertheless, allow me to elaborate on some specific issues of special interest to my country.

My country, as was the whole international community, all peace-loving nations and people, was shocked and horrified by the most brutal and devastating terrorist acts in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001. We resolutely condemn all forms of terrorism and express our profound solidarity with, and the deepest sympathy to, the United States and its people.

It is clear that the newly emerging perception of security risks and threats will influence our outlook on disarmament issues, primarily on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery. It will require us to further develop the relevant international mechanisms and legal instruments to prevent terrorists from obtaining, or even using, any kind of weapon of mass destruction. The Czech Republic, therefore, will support all efforts aimed at strengthening all international non-proliferation regimes, taking special account of non-State actors, and will execute responsible export policies on the national level.

The Czech Republic has always been a proponent of clear, practical and realistic steps in nuclear disarmament and supported measures aimed at the non-

proliferation of nuclear weapons. We therefore believe that the achievements of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should not be lost, and we would like to highlight the importance of implementing the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of that Conference. We renew our call for universal adherence to the Treaty, as well as for full compliance by all the States parties.

We also reaffirm our commitment to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and hope that all States will maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear testing until the CTBT enters into force. We welcome the progress achieved in the ratification process and in the work of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization, particularly in building the International Monitoring System. The Czech Republic continues to be actively involved in the development of the monitoring and communication networks.

In spite of tremendous effort and high aspirations, we have not succeeded in establishing the verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. The Czech Republic was supportive of the compromise text of the draft of the verification protocol, but we view the outcome as a reflection of political reality. Now, as we consider other options, we should ensure that we do not lose what has been achieved. We believe that the mandate of the expert group remains in force and that we will be able to use the many elements of the draft verification protocol in our further work. We hope that the forthcoming Fifth Review Conference will give rise to new prospects for the credible verification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Joint precautions against the danger of bio-terrorism must be accorded high priority.

The functioning of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), entrusted with the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), in general meets our expectations. In terms of its membership, the OPCW must become a truly universal institution and focus on verification activities. The current budgetary situation of the OPCW must not lead to, and in our view does not justify, any verification activity restrictions. The credibility of the Convention must not be undermined.

We are also seriously concerned about the increased risk of the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Priority must be given to preventive measures aimed at developing an internationally recognized instrument regulating this area. In this regard, we strongly support efforts aimed at the finalization and universalization of the international code of conduct proposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime.

As I have already mentioned, we are of the view that the new situation will necessitate rethinking security concepts to ensure stability and security in the world. Any such concept will have to include the continuation of the disarmament process, arms control and non-proliferation. We also consider the strengthening of defence capacities against a potential attack to be an absolutely legitimate step that any Government can take. Given the complexity of the missile defence issue and its security impact on the world community, we support all efforts undertaken with a view to achieving an understanding between both parties to the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. The latest rounds of bilateral consultation between the United States and the Russian Federation have sparked hopes that it may be possible reach an agreement on a new strategic framework that will correspond to the latest developments in the global security situation.

Yet again, I must express our concern and disappointment at the continued political paralysis of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. We stress the importance of approving the programme of work so that negotiations can resume and the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum does not slip into irrelevance. In this connection, I would like to repeat our call for launching negotiations on substantive issues, particularly on the fissile material cut-off treaty. As for the expansion of the Conference, we maintain our interest in becoming a full-fledged member, and invite members of the Conference to act constructively on the enlargement issue.

Despite the justified increased focus on weapons of mass destruction and their non-proliferation, we should not lose sight of the issue of conventional weapons. The Czech Republic supports the eradication of illicit transfers of small arms and light weapons, in accordance with the Programme of Action adopted at the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Although the document approved did not completely fulfil our expectations, it contains a whole range of measures that need to be implemented as early as possible, both at national and regional levels and on a

global scale. The Czech Republic is prepared to cooperate and contribute to the follow-up process at the regional and the global levels by providing assistance and joining the discussions on additional instruments. It is clear that the political will of member States, a forthcoming approach and the unified interpretation of all provisions, as well as their consistent implementation, will be of crucial importance.

I would also like to voice the Czech Republic's support for the full implementation of the Ottawa Convention, which it ratified in 1999, as well as all final documents from the meetings of the States parties to the Convention. It is my pleasure to inform this forum that in June 2001 we completed the destruction of all stockpiled mines covered by the Ottawa Convention.

The Czech Republic will also do its best to achieve a positive outcome at the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), to be held in December this year. Regarding the proposed agenda, we will give our support to all proposals that enhance the applicability of the CCW. We are especially ready to support proposals to extend the scope of the CCW to cover non-international armed conflict and to begin the process of considering how the CCW should deal with the issue of explosive remnants of war.

This Committee has a unique opportunity to address, in a multilateral fashion, the specific issues on its agenda. We believe that it is necessary to approach these topics from the overall perspective of a world that is changing rapidly because of political and economic, as well as technological, developments. All credible and efficient steps undertaken in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation must take these factors into consideration. This challenge lies ahead of us. The Czech Republic wants to play its part in building a safer world.

Mr. Sharma (Nepal): Allow me to offer my delegation's sincere congratulations to you, Sir, upon your well-deserved election to the Chair of the First Committee. Our congratulations also go to the other members of the Bureau. We have full confidence in your ability to successfully steer the deliberations of the Committee, and you can count on my delegation's full support.

My delegation also appreciates the Secretary-General's report on various issues related to disarmament and international security, and we commend the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, for his thought-provoking introductory remarks at the beginning of the general debate.

Disarmament is central to promoting peace and stability, as well as giving peoples around the world peace of mind and a sense of security. Since public opinion is the driving force of public policy, ideally disarmament should have been a subject of debate and dialogue, from gossip circles to public forums, from informal clubs to negotiating tables, and from academia to the corridors of power. However, it is deeply disturbing that disarmament has slipped from our collective consciousness for some time, to our immense peril.

The 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States were a nerve-rattling wake-up call about the likely dangers that lie ahead. It is time for the international community to come out of its lull and re-energize and renew debates and dialogues to pursue disarmament as an integral part of the conscious effort to secure durable peace and security.

Tragically, no tangible progress has been made for some time in the field of disarmament. On the bilateral front, for instance, some of the agreements that have provided strategic global stability are under mortal threat of being demolished, and no new round of negotiations seems to be emerging on the horizon. Even START II is faltering due to lack of the requisite ratification. On the multilateral front, the euphoria consequent on the successful Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference in 2000 appears to have waned. The unequivocal undertaking of the declared five nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament still remains to be matched by action. Most dishearteningly, the Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating forum in this area, has failed for the last few years even to agree on a programme of work, let alone make any progress in conducting fruitful negotiations.

Non-proliferation is now overshadowing disarmament. Even in this area progress has been much too slow. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), despite 161 countries signing and 82 ratifying it, lacks sufficient ratification, as 13 out of 44 countries that must ratify it before it comes into effect have not

done so. Two of the five nuclear Powers also have yet to ratify the Treaty. The Treaty's coming into force still seems remote.

My delegation believes that, while non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is important in the short run to prevent their falling into the wrong hands, we must pursue their elimination as our ultimate goal. Such weapons have given us a cold war. They might give us a hot war and a cold peace, but durable and calm peace will not be possible until they have been totally eradicated.

Therefore, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to implement the 13 steps agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and match their commitments with deeds by eliminating their nuclear arsenals as per article VI of the NPT. We also ask all States whose ratification is required for the CTBT to come into effect to ratify it without delay. The strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention and ensuring the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention ought to be pressed forward equally vigorously.

The Conference on Disarmament must be activated and given the important task, among other things, of negotiating an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as a fissile material cut-off treaty.

My delegation believes that outer space must remain free of weapons. Deeper bilateral cuts in weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear arms, will be necessary to ensure broad-based negotiations to eliminate them. We therefore ask the nuclear-weapon States with the highest number of weapons in their possession to engage in bilateral negotiations to reduce their stockpiles substantially, and we encourage broad-based negotiations at the earliest.

Small arms and light weapons have become the principal tools of killing, mostly of innocent people, in the hands of non-State actors. Nepal would have liked to see a prohibition on the sale of arms to non-State actors and a restriction on the possession of concealable weapons by civilians included in the Programme of Action of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, held earlier this year. Yet we take solace in the fact that the Conference agreed to take measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in these categories of weapons, and hope that controlling small arms is a work in progress.

Before concluding, let me briefly touch upon the relocation of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific to Kathmandu, where it belongs, pursuant to resolution 42/39 D. I profoundly appreciate all our friends for their consistent support and encouragement in the past in this regard. I am now happy to report that, following resolution 55/34 H, His Majesty's Government of Nepal decided on 2 July 2001 to bear the annual operational cost of the Regional Centre once it has moved to Nepal. An appropriate office building has already been identified in Kathmandu. We have also informed the United Nations Secretariat that, following its advice, Nepal is ready to sign a new host country agreement and the letters to be exchanged.

In view of this development, my delegation will introduce in the First Committee a draft resolution urging the Secretary-General to ensure the physical operation of the Centre from Kathmandu not later than a couple of months from now. I believe we will have, as in the past, full cooperation from all delegations for the adoption of the draft resolution.

Ms. Bohlen (United States): Before I begin, please accept my congratulations, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. I am confident — and my colleagues share my confidence — that the skill, experience, and knowledge that you and the Bureau bring to First Committee deliberations will assist us in a successful conclusion to our endeavours. I would also like to express my appreciation for the moment of silence observed by the Committee at its second meeting, on 4 October 2001.

We convene during a solemn period for humanity. Just four weeks ago a horrendous attack was carried out against this city and the international community. In addition to several thousand Americans, hundreds of citizens from 80 different nations lost their lives at the hands of a well-organized group of terrorists who showed total disdain for the innocents who suffered and perished. The world was shocked and appalled by these criminal events. The depravity of those acts, the tragic loss of life and the horrifying destruction mark that day forever as a sad chapter in human history. We are deeply grateful for the outpouring of sympathy that came to us from all over the world and for the solidarity shown by the international community in undertaking the long struggle now just beginning to bring the perpetrators to account and to fight terrorism

wherever it manifests itself with all the weapons at our disposal.

The events of 11 September and the continuing concerns we all share underscore the need to take a fresh look at the international community's traditional convictions and approaches to security. We must strengthen them where appropriate, but we must also consider new ways to reduce the terrorist threat to mankind.

Responsible Governments must assure the security and safety of their citizens and of civil society as a whole. We are not free to stand aside and watch our citizens be slaughtered, nor can we tolerate international aggression or other forcible assaults on key interests and values. Criminals and terrorists who possess the means to threaten society, and who have shown no reluctance to use them, are a danger to us all and threaten the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament. Governments throughout the world must cooperate and devote appropriate energy and resources to finding them, bringing them to justice and rooting out the organized networks that enable them to operate.

There is intense concern that some of these terrorists and criminals may continue to seek to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. This gives the international community important and persuasive reasons to redouble our non-proliferation and arms control efforts. We must also strengthen other mechanisms intended to ensure that toxic and dangerous materials remain under appropriate control and are used solely for legal and constructive purposes. The United States Government is actively examining these questions, and we would welcome ideas and views of others on how best to achieve these goals. We hope to enlist the help of all the Members of the United Nations in the fight against terrorism and the threats posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Delegations to the First Committee have come here to consider issues of disarmament, arms control and international peace and security. We will consider resolutions that focus on ways and means to reduce the potential harm to mankind from the tools of war, from small arms to weapons of mass destruction. We will not always agree on the best ways to reduce these dangers, but we can exchange insights, discuss alternate approaches and seek to persuade each other.

Let me begin by reiterating and emphasizing the strong support of the United States for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As a nuclear-weapon State, the United States understands its special responsibility under article VI to take steps related to nuclear disarmament. President Bush has made clear that the United States will reduce its nuclear forces to the lowest possible level that is compatible with the security of the United States and its allies.

Parties to the NPT and United Nations Member States, including the United States, have repeatedly called for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. We are extremely disappointed that the continuing deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament is preventing the start of these negotiations. We urge all members of the Conference to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty without further delay.

The United States is keenly aware of the dangers we face in today's global environment. Earlier this year my Government began a strategic policy review that is beginning to bear fruit. As one example, members are aware that the United States Government and the Government of the Russian Federation have been intensively discussing a new strategic framework. This framework will be premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation. It will reflect a clean and clear break from the cold war. It will also include substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces, cooperation on missile defence, enhanced non- and counter-proliferation efforts and measures to promote confidence and transparency.

In this context, I must reiterate that the United States is firmly opposed to the United Nations inserting itself into issues regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which remains a matter for the parties. As I just noted, discussions between the Russian Federation and my country on a new strategic framework, including a revised approach to the ABM Treaty, have intensified in recent months and they will continue. In these circumstances it seems to us even more inappropriate for the ABM Treaty to be dealt with here in this forum. If a resolution on the ABM Treaty is introduced again this year, the United States will again vote no on it. We urge our friends and allies to do the same. Today's world provides both new threats and

new opportunities. We must be able to react to these changes.

Let me emphasize, however, that the United States is committed to working constructively with all members of the international community to develop broad support for an effective agenda to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to ensure meaningful arms control. It is not just two or three nations that are threatened in today's world; the entire globe faces security challenges. We are prepared to work together in search of common ground, but we do not want to engage activities that would undercut genuine efforts to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction and address other very real security threats.

Unspeakable though the acts of 11 September were, they unfortunately do not exhaust the full range of deadly weapons available to a determined and merciless terrorist. Much has been written in recent weeks about the threat of the use of biological weapons and about the dangers of toxins and biological agents being dispersed in areas with large concentrations of people. While the ease of resorting to such weapons is sometimes overestimated in the press, the possibility that biological weapons might be used on a massive scale must now, after 11 September, be regarded as less remote than before.

This possibility must give new urgency to our efforts to combat the threat of biological weapons — and by weapons I mean here biological agents used with lethal intent. A first step must be to strengthen the norms against use of biological weapons, to make clear and doubly clear that this form of terrorism, like all others, is unacceptable. We believe that the international community, which has in Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) so clearly stated its resolve to combat terrorism by all the means at its disposal, must equally clearly state that any use of biological weapons — whether by a State, an organization or an individual — would be a crime against humanity to which the international community will respond. We must also make clear that the transfer of biological weapons and other toxins to those who would use them is similarly unacceptable.

Over the past six years, the United States and many other countries have sought to negotiate in Geneva a protocol that would strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) — that is, to give force to its prohibitions against possession, development, stockpiling and acquisition. Last July, the United States made clear that it could not support the proposed protocol, because the measures that were proposed to enforce the ban against possession and development were neither effective nor equitable — and given the inherent properties of biological products, it seems all but certain, in our view, that they can never be made so. This continues to be our view.

But in addition, the events of 11 September have reinforced our view that the focus must be on use. The international community must here and now state its abhorrence of use; we must all strengthen our national laws criminalizing use and transfer; and we must all agree that use and transfer are crimes to which our many mutual treaties of extradition would apply. We must give ourselves the means to question and challenge in the event of suspected use.

And we must be able to distinguish an outbreak of illness caused by biological weapons from a naturally occurring illness. And in the unthinkable event that a major biological weapon incident occurs somewhere, we need to pool, as much as we can, our knowledge and expertise to minimize the effects. That is why the United States is working closely with many nations to improve our common preparedness to mitigate and respond to biological weapon attacks, and why we intend to expand this cooperation, especially in the area of medical consequence management.

The United States is also fully engaged in international efforts against chemical weapons. Our goals remain the worldwide destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons and full compliance with the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of these weapons of mass destruction. We are also assisting the Russian Federation in its stockpile destruction program. We note that it is not only chemical-weapons activities that are of concern. In Japan, terrorists made and used nerve gas. It is essential that Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) member States put in place national laws and other regulations that help to keep materials for making chemical weapons out of unauthorized hands and ensure effective prosecution of those who make or use chemical weapons.

Each of us must do all he can to control the export from our countries of sensitive goods and technologies related to weapons of mass destruction.

This effort remains essential if we are to prevent the spread of these weapons, not only to Governments that would use such weapons against others but to terrorists as well. Improvements in border controls and monitoring will also help in this effort.

The conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference included several measures related to curtailing the potential risk of terrorism involving nuclear material. Among such steps are the strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, revising the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, improving national standards of security and physical protection of nuclear material, establishing stronger regulatory control over radioactive sources and enhancing international cooperation against illicit trafficking in nuclear material. These measures will address not only concerns about nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, but also the threats to health and life posed by indiscriminate dispersal of radioactive materials. Improving the security and safety of civil nuclear installations against sabotage is also an important step.

The United States takes seriously its obligations under the arms control agreements to which we are a party. We lead the way in assisting foreign nations to counter the proliferation of deadly technology. We are prepared to engage in negotiations that will result in greater peace and security for the international community. We are fully aware of the consequences to our security and that of the international system arising from the changing nature of the threats posed in today's world. The United States delegation will examine carefully the resolutions, which are to be tabled over the coming days, taking into account the need to ensure our own security as we pursue arms control and disarmament objectives that can enhance security for all. And all nations should craft their proposals bearing in mind the real threat to our security that the events of 11 September so horribly demonstrated.

The world has changed, but many basic issues continue to command our attention and effort. The members of this body have a responsibility to address challenges to international security, both existing and new, and my delegation is ready to work with you and our counterparts.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.